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ANN B. HOPKINS, RESPONDENT
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER
What was the “true reason” for Price Waterhouse’s
decision to place Ann Hopkins’ partnership candidacy on
“hold”? Was it “because of [her] * * * sex,” and thus
in violation of Section 708(a) (1) of Title VII? That is,
ultimately, the sole issue in this case.
Respondent and her amici seek to obscure the charac-
ter of this issue, first, by giving misleading accounts of
the facts and findings in this case, and, then, by bringing
forward a confusing storm of new, distracting, and con-
tradictory legal theories, all of them either wrong or in-
apposite to this case.
I.
A. Respondent attempts to picture this case as one
where brilliant employee, obviously entitled to partner-
ship by all “objective” criteria, was in effect vetoed—
“blocked”—by the sexist negative comments of a few
partners who knew little of her or her work and whose
opinions therefore clearly were based on discriminatory
motives.
This is a false picture, completely at odds with the
findings of the district court and with the undisputed
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facts. Hopkins’ promotion was in no way “blocked” or
“thwarted” by the negative views of a few partners who
did not know her work and who submitted sexist reports.
In fact, this entire picture of a “veto” system at Price
Waterhouse is false. The decisionmaking process at
Price Waterhouse involved an extensive evaluation by
both the Admissions Committee and the Policy Board of
Hopkins’ entire record at the Firm, based on all available
information. This included not only all of the written
responses to the partnership “survey” about Hopkins’
candidacy, but prior evaluations of her work and inter-
views with partners about the bases for their views of
Hopkins. The totality of this information provided mas-
sive support for the district court’s conclusion that
Hopkins’ “conduct provided ample justification for the
complaints that formed the basis of the Policy Board’s
decision” (Pet. App. 46a-47a) (emphasis added). That
information included facts—and misgivings based on those
facts—furnished in long form reports by many of
Hopkins’ supporters. (Thus it was Thomas Beyer,
Hopkins’ chief sponsor, who wrote that Hopkins would
“loge sensitivity for staff’ (Def. Ex. 27), and whotesti-
fied that he had already warned Hopkins that her harsh
and unseemly behavior would jeopardize her partnership
possibilities (see Pet. Br. 8).?
1 Regpondent’s “colorization” of the facts is considerably abetted
by her practice of imputing to the district court “findings” that the
district court did not find. Thus, respondent says (Br. 7-8), “the
district court accepted Hopkins’ central argument: ‘that she was
not evaluated as a manager, but as a woman manager, based on a
sexual stereotype that prompts [some] males to regard assertive
behavior in women as being more offensive and intolerable than
comparable behavior in men because some men do not regard it as
appropriate feminine behavior’ (Pet. App. 5la).” A glance at the
cited portion of the district court’s opinion will show, however, that
the court was simply describing Hopkins’ claims (“[s]he claims
that she was not evaluated ... [etc.]”) (emphasis added) and not
making findings at all.
2 Another early supporter reported that Hopkins “can be abrasive,





The information about Hopkins’ character and per-
formance furnished in the long form reports was entirely
consistent with and confirmed the information derived
from the short form reports and from the previousevalu-
ations of Hopkins’ work. It was not the views of a few
ill-informed outsiders, but the consensus view, that there
existed major shortcomings in Hopkins’ ability to deal
with co-workers and subordinates ; it was this consensus
that resulted in the fact that a detailed statistical profile
derived from all the evaluations submitted by partners
gave Hopkinslow overall ratings for “tolerance,” “sensi-
tivity,” “tact,” “leadership,” and “congeniality” (Def.
Ex. 27; see Connor Dep. 31-33) .* Indeed, evaluations by
both the long and short form commenters, when sum-
marized by the Admissions Committee in the statistical
profile, showed that Hopkins ranked second tolast of all
candidates in her class in “personal attributes.” Def. Ex.
35, 36.
Under these circumstances, it would not have been sur-
prising had the Policy Board voted to reject Hopkins
outright. Her candidacy was placed on hold only because
the Chairman and Senior Partner of the Firm, Joseph
Connor, decided “that [he] would push in the Policy
turmoil” (Def. Ex. 27, Epelbaum). Other partners who had worked
very closely with Hopkins noted that staff disliked working for her
(ibid., Statland and Coffey) and that she was “Just plain rough on
people” (ibid., Coffey).
3 We remind the Court that of the 32 partners. who submitted
evaluations of Hopkins, only 18 thought she should be made a part-
ner. Eleven thought she should be rejected or held, and eight made
no recommendation. Def. Ex. 27. Wealso note that of the 13 part-
ners who recommended that Hopkins be admitted to the partnership,
ten were short form commenters, while only three of thesix
partners who completed long form evaluations recommended her
for partnership. Hopkins’ suggestion (Br. 4-5) that her candidacy
was “blocked” by the recommendations of the short form com-
menters is thus belied by the record; as Beyer, Hopkins’ strongest
supporter, testified, “[i]t’s generally accepted in the firm that you
need five, six favorable long form votes to be even seriously consid-




Board’s discussions for a hold and give her a cha
nce to
see if she could work on [interpersonal skills] and ov
er-
come some of these impediments” (Connor Dep.
30).
Connor further testified that he “had some real trou
ble
with the Policy Board because the record clearly just
ified
ano.” Ibid.
Respondent also conveys a distorted picture of the
short form reports. These reports were filled out,
not by
partners who “barely knew” Hopkins (Resp. Br. 29) bu
t
by partners who had “less than full time involve
ment”
with her (Connor Dep. 62).4 Nor were these reports
limited to conclusory (and supposedly sexist) adjectives
(“hard-driving”; “aggressive”; “abrasive” (NOW Br. 6;
Resp. Br. 9)); they werefilled with specific information
about the facts of Hopkins’ inability to deal with staff.
Partners noted that Hopkins “tended to alienate the staff
in that she was extremely overbearing” toward them
(Def. Ex. 27, Green), and that she lacked “leadership
qualities” (ibid., Wheaton) and might be unable “to de-
velop & motivate [Price Waterhouse’s] staff as a [part-
ner]” (ibid., Fridley). Others reported that staff and
peer reaction to Hopkins was “uniformly negative”
(ibid., Docter), and that she was “yniversally disliked by
the staff” (ibid., Everett) .
The fact is that the short form and long form reports,
as well as the other evidence available to the Admissions
Committee and the Policy Board—derived from Hopkins’
supporters, opponents, and neutrals®—add up to a re-
4“Pyll-time involvement” with Hopkins by the relev
ant partner
was of course not essential for reaching an inform
ed view about
Hopkins’ staff relations. Managers and staff, many o
f whom had
extensive dealings with Hopkins, would naturally
report their
problems with Hopkins to partners (see, e.g., Def. E
x. 27, Docter,
reporting the “uniformly negative’ input of “3-5 M
AS [senior
managers] who have worked with [Hopkins] extens
ively”).
5 The reports from partners who acknowledged that t
hey did not
have sufficient information to make an ultimate j
udgment about
Hopkins’ candidacy were also full of comments ab
out the fact that
she was “weak in interpersonal skills” (Def. Ex
. 27, Johnson),












markable congruity of opinion. Hopkins was an able and
talented businesswoman,’ whose performance at Price
Waterhouse nevertheless was persistently marred by
shortcomings in her ability to deal with co-workers (par-
ticularly subordinates). That is why the district court
found that both “[s]upporters and opponents of her
candidacy indicated that [Hopkins] was sometimes overly
aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult to work with and im-
patient with staff’ (Pet. App. 48a-44a). Given these
circumstances, and given the nature of the partnership
relationship, it was eminently reasonable and responsi-
ble for the Policy Board to conclude that she should not
be proposed for admission to the partnership at that
time.
B. Even more unfair is respondent’s persistent in-
nuendo that the record shows that opponents of Hopkins’
candidacy couched their opposition in terms that the dis-
trict court found to be sexist, so that the “evidence” of
“stereotyping” in this case related to the very personsin
the firm who supposedly “blocked” her candidacy.
But as Judge Williams’ dissent demonstrates in detail
(see Pet. App. 29a-36a), all except one of the comments
that could in the faintest way be characterized as overtly
sexist (¢.g., “a lady using foul language”; “macho”; “ma-
tured from a tough-talking, somewhat masculine hard-
nosed mgr. to an authoritative, formidable, but much
more appealing lady partner candidate”) were made by
partners who supported Hopkins’ candidacy. (The one
exception is the remark that Hopkins should take a
6 Though Price Waterhouse did indeed assign Hopkins the task
of drafting proposals that brought new work to the Firm, the sug-
gestion that she singlehandedly captured $30 to $40 million in new
business (NOW Br. 5) is silly. The massive proposals that gen-
erated these revenues were typically prepared over months and
years by elaborate teams of Price Waterhouse managers and part-
ners; as Hopkins herself testified, while she had been a contributor
to successful proposals for new work, “[t]heentire team of people






“course at charm school,” which was a passing phrase
in a thoughtful comment opposing her candidacy; its
weight as evidence of sexual discrimination is adequately
disposed of by Judge Williams (see Pet. Br. 16 & n.4).)
There is, in sum, not a jot or tittle of support, either
in the record or in the district court’s findings, for re-
spondent’s claim that her candidacy was simply “blocked”
by opponents who, although unfamiliar with her work,
made negative recommendations on the basis of judg-
ments that were shown to have been based on sexist
stereotypes.
C. It is, of course, the case that Hopkins frequently
was characterized by both opponents and supporters as
aggressive, harsh, insensitive, and overbearing. It is the
use of these general adjectives, in no way overtly sexist,
that is seen by some of respondent’s amici as reflecting
the existence of sexual stereotyping at Price Waterhouse.
But of course this creates a problem: what language is
it permissible to use to describe a woman whois in ‘fact
aggressive, harsh, insensitive, and overbearing? If there
exists a fair basis for concluding that there are facts to
support these adjectives, should their mere use be de-
nounced as a violation of Title VIIl—without inquiry
into the facts?
With this question, we reach the problem of Dr. Fiske’s
testimony and its role in this case. Respondent’s amici
tilt with a straw man when they explain at great length
that sexual stereotyping can and does exist and can and
does lead to discrimination against women.? Of course
that is the case. Nor do we doubt that good social science
7 Hopkins and her amici rely on some of this Court’s decisions
condemning disparate treatment resulting from sex stereotypes
(e.g., Resp. Br. 30, 46-47; NOW Br. 31-33). These cases involved
facially discriminatory policies that were the product of stereotyped
notions of the differences between men and women. See, e.9.,
Mississippt University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729
(1982) (“excluding males from [nursingschool] tends to perpetuate
the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman’s job”).
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can help untangle difficult factual perplexities in discrim-
ination cases.
The question here is the particular one, whether Dr.
Fiske’s particular testimony—which constituted a critical
element in the district court’s conclusion that Title VII
was violated by unlawful “motivation” on the part of
Price Waterhouse—was reasonably probative of that
proposition—that is, whether it was valid social science
to use Dr. Fiske’s reasoning process as evidence of the
fact that sexual discrimination tainted Price Water-
house’s decision in this case.
Our central submission is simple: it was illegitimate
—and bad social science—for Dr. Fiske to conclude, and
for the district court to accept Dr. Fiske’s conclusion,
that a discriminatory motive was shown to have existed
in this case simply because words were used to charac-
terize Hopkins that have been shown in statistical samp-
lings of other situations to be associated with sexism.®
§ This Court cannot bethe arbiter of what is valid social science.
But, in light of the claims made in some of the amicus briefs
(particularly the brief of the American Psychological Association
(APA)), we point out that Dr. Fiske’s testimony in this case
violated elementary principles of adequate methodology. See gen-
erally T. Cook & D. Campbell, Quasi-Experimentation: Design &
Analysis Issues for Field Settings 37-95 (1979).
First, Dr. Fiske should have tested the “fit” of the terms used
to describe Hopkins with the subject of analysis. See Cook & Camp-
bell at 86. Dr. Fiske could have tested this fit either by asking
former employees, co-workers, friends, and acquaintances to fill
out evaluation forms similar to those used in the Price Waterhouse
partnership selection process, or by actually interviewing Hopkins.
Second, when Dr. Fiske examined therecords of other partnership
candidates (J.A. 44), she should have conducted blind comparisons
of those records with Hopkins’ record in order to determine whether
the terms used to describe Hopkins’ interpersonal skills differed
substantially from the terms used to describe the other candi-
dates. See Cook & Campbell at 87. Had Dr. Fiske made these com-
parisons, she might well have come upon the evidence showing
that interpersonal skills were a key consideration in the case of
numerous male partnership candidates whom the firm decided to
reject or to hold. See, e.g., Def. Ex. 64, Tab 5 (male candidate
rejected because he “ranksrelatively low among candidates in a
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Simply put, “ ‘a study must rule out, or control for, com-
peting hypotheses that may account for an observed state
of affairs.’ ” (APA Br. 6 (citation omitted)). Dr.
Fiske’s egregious error was her failure to rule out the
possibility that Hopkins was indeed “abrasive,” “aggres-
sive,” and “overbearing.”
If Dr. Fiske’s analysis is permitted to establish Title
VII liability, no employer can deny a partnership to any
woman with a harsh, overbearing, and insensitive per- |
number of attributes including administration, communications,
judgment, tact, congeniality and acceptance by associates/partners”;
“Chje has been described as boisterous, lacking in social tact and
judgment, continually complaining, loud and abrasive, overbearing,
opinionated”) ; id. at Tab 6 (male candidate placed on hold because
short form evaluations characterized him as “ ‘not outgoing,’ ‘offi-
cious,’ ‘overbearing’”); id. at Tab 9 (male candidate placed on
hold in part because he “is very aggressive and tough on staff’) ;
id. at Tab 10 (male candidate rejected because “[h]is ability to
deal with partners and staff is seriously impaired by personality
attributes which are described as negative and abrasive”); id. at
Tab 11 (rejected male candidate characterized as “immature, over- |
bearing, gossipy and highly political in his business conduct”) ; id.
at Tab 17 (male candidate placed on hold because he “has a tre-
mendous ego and sometimes appears to be abrasive and brash’’).
Third, Dr. Fiske made noattempt totest the question whether
Price Waterhouse partners “matched” the samples employed in
other sex stereotyping research. See Cook & Campbell at 42.
Cook and Campbell (the latter a past president of the American
Psychological Association) are widely regarded as experts in the
field of research design and the conduct of randomized experiments
in field settings. See Glass & Asher, Causation and Quasi-
Experimental Design, 25 Contemp. Psychology 772, 773 (1980).
Quasi-Experimentation is about “drawing causal inferences in field
research.” Glass & Asher at 774. The validity chapter is renowned
i
for its “contribution to the methodology of the social sciences that q
is deep and penetrating; it is absolutely essential for advancing
further our thinking on the methodology of empirical research.”
Id. at 775. Scholars claim that Cook and Campbell’s work on
analyzing research designs “gives all researchers a powerful lan-
guage for assessing the strengths and weaknesses of their own
research. Research professionals could hardly ask for much more in
a single volume.” Hennessy, The End of Methodology? A Review






sonality. For, as Judge Williams suggested, “no woman
could be overbearing, arrogant or abrasive: any obser-
vations to that effect would necessarily be discounted as
the product of stereotyping.” Pet. App. 36a (Williams,
J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
D. We add a word about the so-called “smoking
—ThomasBeyer’s remark, made after Hopkins’ partner-
ship was placed on hold, that in his opinion she should
act more femininely. Respondent places heavy reliance on
the remark. Resp. Br. 8, 43-44. More astonishingly, the
Solicitor General asserts that this remark, by itself, per-
missibly may serve as the basis of a future finding by
the district court that the decision to postpone Hopkins’
partnership bid “was caused” by an unlawful motive.
USS. Br. 27.
Beyer madethis remark to Hopkins after the Policy
Board accepted the Admissions Committee’s recommen-
dation to place Hopkins’ candidacy on hold. Beyer him-
self was, of course, not a member of either group. He
was Hopkins’ strongest (and, therefore, obviously most
disappointed) supporter. Can his inept post-hoc remark
about how his protégé should behave in the future serve
as sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the
Policy Board’s past decision was in fact tainted by dis-
criminatory motives?
Wesuggest that the answer must be “no.” The rea-
sons for the Policy Board’s decision were communicated
to Hopkins by the Firm’s Chairman and Senior Partner
at a meeting explicitly and especially dedicated to a dis-
cussion of the partnership decision and Hopkins’ future
prospects (Tr. 87-95, 167; Connor Dep. 87-38, 53-62).
Hopkinstestified that none of the reasons mentioned at
that meeting had anything to do with her sex (Tr. 95).
In light of this, the notion that Beyer had the “respon-
sibility” for telling Hopkins why her candidacy had been
postponed is simply an invention (and, as Judge Williams
said below (Pet. App. 3la-32a), the district court’s cas-





any breath of evidence). But in any event, to take Bey-
er’s advice to Hopkins asitself constituting sufficient evi-
dence that the members of the two relevant committees
had in fact been motivated by illegal and obnoxious mo-
tives—in the face of overwhelming evidence that they
had before them ample legitimate reasons to have mis-
givings about Hopkins’ candidacy—would be unfair and
misguided.
 
The Solicitor General’s submission that the Beyer re-
mark could by itself “support” a finding that the decision
to put Hopkins on hold was “caused” by a discriminatory
motive is an egregious example of the practice this Court
rejected in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 US.
474, 488 (1951), when it stated that “[t]he substantial-
ity of evidence must take into account whatever in the
record fairly detracts from its weight.” The law requires
that there be “record evidence which provides a rational
or logical basis for the finding and for the consequent
presumption that the finding was in fact the product of
reasoning from evidence. This must mean evidence in
the case and in the context of the case.” Jaffe, Judicial
Review: Question of Fact, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1020, 1027
(1956) (emphasis in original). So in this case. To base
a finding on a single item of evidence torn from the con-
text of the case “is to imagine an abstract case, a case
that was never tried.” Ibid. Where the record presents
undisputed and indisputable evidence that there existed a
bona fide, nondiscriminatory basis for an employment de-
cision, it is wholly illegitimate and unfair to suggest that
that evidence should simply be overridden by an isolated
incident consisting of an after-the-fact remark by Hop-
kins’ mentor (himself not a decisionmaker) that—only
by implication—attributes to the responsible actors a
willingness to be influenced by impermissible and deplor-
able motives.
II.
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the briefs sub-
mitted by respondent and her amici in this case is the






the scene has abandoned the court of appeals. Appar-
ently it is now conceded on all sides (see, e.g., Resp. Br.
35 n.20) that the court of appeals erred when it held
that the burden of persuasion on the issue of liability
shifts to the defendant inso-called “mixed motives”
cases.°
Respondent and her amici attempt to salvage some-
thing from this admission of defeat by injecting into this
case, at the eleventh hour, a confusing welter of new
legal theories. But there is one unifying theme that un-
derlies all of these theories: they are all designed to
dilute—indeed, virtually to eliminate—the requirement
that, in order for Hopkins to win her case, it must be
found that she did not become a partner because of in-
tentional discrimination. Causation has always been the
key issue of fact in this case, and now respondent and
her amici make it the key issue of law as well.
A. Having conceded that the court of appeals was in
error in shifting the burden of persuasion to the defend-
ant on the issue of liability, respondent and her amici
defend the court of appeals’ judgment by proposing a
theory of liability for this case that would drain this con-
cession of all significance. Specifically, they propose that
Hopkins’ burden consists, not of showing that her failure
to be promoted was caused by unlawful discrimination,
but merely of showing that the challenged employment
decision was in some way “affected” by stereotypes.
Whatdoes it mean, that a decision was “affected” by—
even though not caused by—discriminatory motives?
This remains a mystery wrapped in an enigma. Its solu-
tion is not helped by the fact that respondent and her
amici present divergent formulations as to how signifi-
cant a “factor” discrimination must be. Noris it helped
 
®In a submission of profound obscurity, respondent argues (Br.
35 n.20) that the court of appeals’ error in shifting the burden of
proof to Price Waterhouse constituted a benefit to Price Waterhouse.
Weare unableto follow her reasoning.
10 Hopkins and her amici use different definitions, agreeing only
on the proposition that, whatever the label used, very little indeed
 
 




by respondent’s explicit avowal (Br. 28) that the matte
r
is not susceptible to “precise” formulation. In the end
,
respondent is forced to rest (Br. 29) with the distri
ct
court’s unhelpful formula: Title VII was violated be-
cause stereotyping supposedly played “an undefined role”
in blocking Hopkins’ admission to partnership.”
As we demonstrated in our opening brief, the language
and legislative history of Title VII make it quite clear
that, in an individual Title VII case involving disparate
treatment, causation in fact is a necessary element of
Title VII liability. To use the Solicitor General’s words,
causation is shown only if the discriminatory motive
“was a necessary element in any set of factors that to-
gether was sufficient to produce the outcome” (U.S. Br.
13) (emphasis added) .”? Respondent and her amici ap-
need be shown before an employer may be adjudged a “proven wron
g-
doer” and hence found to have violated Title VII. See, e.g., Resp.
Br. 31 (plaintiff’s burden is merely to prove that “discrimination,
affected an employment decision”) ; NOW Br. 36-37 (plaintiff ne
ed
prove only that “sex is * * * a factor in the employmentdecision
” )
(emphasis in original); City Bar Br. 11 (liability is establis
hed
if the plaintiff proves that the employment decision was “tain
ted
by evaluations incorporating disappointed sex-role assumptions’’
) ;
AFL-CIO Br. 26 (plaintiff need proveonly “that sex * * *
played
a negative role in the decisionmaking process concerning a ter
m,
condition, or privilege of employment”).
11 Of course respondent insists (Br. 29) that she is not talking
about discrimination “in the air.” But what exactly does it mean
to say that unconscious sex stereotyping played an “unquantifiable”’
and “undefined” role in a decision that would, by hypothesis, have
been the same even in the absence of stereotyping? If thedis-
criminatory thoughts and feelings supposedly held by some Price
Waterhouse partners in fact made no difference to the decision
that was made, is it not, precisely, the mere existence of those
thoughts and feelings that is made actionable?
12 We hope that the Court will not follow the Solicitor General’s
further excursion (U.S. Br. 11-15) into the labyrinthine mysteries
of causation at commonlaw, and adopt his special (and not easily
understood) gloss on causation that distinguishes between “but
for” cause on the one hand and “sufficient” cause on the other.
. The Solicitor General’s category of “sufficient” cause was devel-








parently concede that Hopkins has not made and cannot
make this showing. But they come forward with no rea-
son why this requirement—so plainly in the forefront of
the minds of the eminently pragmatic lawyers who
framed Title VII and so utterly conventional in the law
—should be abandoned.”
manifestly out of place in the Title VII context. It covers the few
bizarre cases where an event is produced by two physical causes
each sufficient to produce a result (X shoots Y at the instant that
Y is hit by lightning). Beyond this, the “sufficiency” standard is
applied in cases involving multiple, tortious actions, each sufficient
by itself to have caused the harm complained of, and none of which
can be ruled out as the cause of the injury. See H.L.A. Hart &
T. Honore, Causation in the Law 123-124 (2d ed. 1985) ; W. Prosser,
Law of Torts 239 (4th ed. 1971). The plaintiff cannot prove in such
a case that he would not have been injured “but for” the tortious
conduct of any particular defendant. Hence some courts allow the
plaintiff to prove liability in these circumstances merely by show-
ing that the defendant’s tortious actions were “sufficient” to have
caused his injury. The policy behind this modification of the “but
for” test is clear: When the wrongful act of each of two defend-
ants is sufficient by itself to cause a plaintiff’s harm, it is unfair
to allow both defendants to escapeliability simply because both
did something that alone would have produced the harm. See
W.Prosser, supra, at 239.
But this policy has no application whatever in the Title VII con-
text. Transposed to so-called “mixed motives” Title VII cases, the
“sufficiency” standard of causation would not ensure, as it does in
its tort context, that an innocent plaintiff may recover from among
various wrongdoers for his loss. Instead, it would operate tosingle
out an illicit motive as a ground for liability for an employment
decision that was perfectly legitimate. It thus would allow a Title
VII plaintiff to succeed though she has suffered no harm at all as
a result of discrimination—because her employer would have reached
precisely the same decision for nondiscriminatory reasons.
13 Respondent and her amici certainly win the prize forthebig-
gest red herring of the year by arguing that Congress’s intention to
create Title VII liability without a showing of “but for” causation
is demonstrated by its rejection of a statutory formula that would
have restricted liability to cases where discrimination was the only
or sole reason for an employment decision. E.q., Resp. Br. 21; NOW
Br. 42-43 & n.36. In fact, Price Waterhouse has never argued that
Title VII liability requires such a showing. The “sole motive” issue
is, in other words, a non-issue.  
14 |
Substitution of any of the diluted formulae proposed
by Hopkins and her amici for a requirement of causa- )
tion in fact would invite a lawsuit for every errant man-
ager’s discriminatory thoughts or comments, regardless
of whether those thoughts or comments (or, indeed, the
manager) made any difference in the outcome of the
employment decision. This is not what Title VII was
intended to accomplish. It was not enacted to ban dis-
criminatory feelings or expressions, by employers or any-
one else. Instead, it requires that the employer ‘must do
or fail to do something in regard to employment * * *
because of’ some discriminatory motive. 110 Cong. Rec.
7254 (1964) (emphasis added). Only insistence that a
Title VII plaintiff establish the usual standard of causa-
tion, by proving that the employer would have reached
a different decision “but for” discrimination, can ensure
that the statute is not turned into a “thought control”
bill. Ibid.; see U.S. Br. 9, 25.4
14 Amicus AFL-CIO argues (Br. 10-14) that causation in fact
must be abandoned in individual disparate treatment cases such as
Hopkins’ because, otherwise, Title VII would leave it open to em-
ployers to maintain systemic employment practices that discrimi-
nate against women (even though no individual employment deci-
sion can be shown to have been caused by discrimination). But
this concern is misplaced. Title VII provides ample remedies for
eliminating such practices without a requirement of “but for”
causation.
First, Section 703(a)(2) outlaws such practices by making it
unlawful for an employer “to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees * * * in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee because of” an impermissible
reason. A sexually biased promotion system obviously would “tend”
to limit employment opportunities by “segregating” and “classify-
ing” employees on impermissible grounds; and an attack under
Section 703(a)(2) would not have to depend on a showing that a
particular woman actually would have been hired or promoted but
for her sex.
Second, facially discriminatory policies may be actionable in
class action disparate treatment cases brought under Section 703
(a)(1). Where, in such cases, the allegation is that the employer,
rather than being guilty of a particular decision not to hire or
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B. Unable to make the required showing of causation,
Hopkins has virtually abandoned her original contention
that Price Waterhouse violated Section 703(a) (1) when
it declined to make her a partner. Instead, she argues
for the first time in her brief to this Court that she
proved a violation of Section 703(a) (2). Resp. Br. 20-
22; see also AFL-CIO Br. 11-13.
But it is much too late for Hopkins to claim that Price
Waterhouse violated Section 703(a) (2) because random
manifestations of sexual stereotyping made an appear-
ance in the comments of some of her evaluators (none of
them actual decisionmakers in her case). No such theory
was tried by the district court, and no review of it was
attempted by either the district court or the court of ap-
peals. Hopkins’ case was brought, tried, and appealed
on the claim that the particular decision not to promote
her at that time was made “because of” her sex and
thus violated Section 703(a) (1) of Title VII. The dis-
tract court expressly found that Hopkins’ evidence failed
to prove “the substantial statistical disparity ordinarily
required to show that a subjective evaluation process
produces a discriminatory disparate impact” (Pet. App.
59a n.16). No serious and focused inquiry was ever
made in this case as to whether stereotyping was such a
general or structural aspect of Price Waterhouse’s part-
nership system that it “classified” or “segregated” em-
promote on account of sex, is guilty of discriminating against a
class in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, the case
may be conceived of as the functional equivalent of a Section 703
(a)(2) case (although presumably at least one member of this
class would have to show somespecific injury in order to create
Article III jurisdiction). (But of course Hopkins did not bring
a class action; her suit alleged that she was not promoted “because
of” her sex.)
Finally, the government may challenge such practices in “pattern-
or-practice” cases brought under Section 707(a). If the govern-
ment proves the existenceof a pattern or practice, prospectiverelief
may be appropriate, even though additional proceedings would be
required to determine the scope of individual relief. Teamsters v.




ployees in violation of Section 703(a) (2). Under these
circumstances, no violation of Section 703(a) (2) can be
deemed to have been shown.
In any event, Hopkins’ eleventh-hour theory confounds
and confuses two different sorts of Title VII cases. Un-
der her new approach, every Section 703(a) (1) viola-
tion automatically would violate Section 703(a) (2), leav-
ing no independent scope for the former section at all.
Section 703 (a) (2)—-whose principal function is to deal
with cases of disparate impact, not disparate treatment ™
—is violated, not by individual, one-shot employment de-
cisions, but by systemic employment practices that dis-
favor, or tend to disfavor, women. Per contra, systemic
practices and classifications that disfavor women, but
cannot be shown to have caused a particular employment
decision, can violate Section 703(a) (2), but are not ac-
tionable in an individual disparate treatment case un-
der Section 703 (a) (1).
In fact, Hopkins’ reliance on Section 703 (a) (2) at this
late hour is simply a desperate attempt to find shelter
under a statutory provision that does not condition liabil-
ity on proof of a causal link between a challenged em-




145 Disparate impact cases “involve employment practices that are
facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in
fact fall more harshly on” women or minorities. Teamsters, 431
U.S. at 336 n.15. See also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co.,
No. 86-6139 (June 29, 1988), slip op. 10 (Section 703(a)(2) pro-
hibits the use of a “system of * * * decisionmaking” that has a
disparate impact).
Plaintiffs alleging disparate impact need not prove that the
challenged policy was the “but for” cause of any particular employ-
ment decision in order toestablish liability. This is because it is
the maintenance of a policy that has an unnecessarily disparate
impact that violates Title VII. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 480-432 (1971). But Hopkins’ case is not a disparate
impact case. She is an individual plaintiff alleging disparate treat-
ment. As such, she is not relieved of the duty of proving that her
partnership bid was placed on hold “because of” intentional
discrimination.
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and thereby to head off the conclusion “that all Title VII
disparate treatment cases should be resolved under the
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework” (U.S. Br. 18)
(emphasis in original), with its requirement that plain-
tiff prove that she was the victim of intentional discrim-
ination. While it is true that the McDonnell Douglas/
Burdine framework does not apply to Section 703 (a) (2)
claims, it is also true that Section 703(a) (2) has no
relevance to Hopkins’ case.
C. The final prong of respondent’s attack on the re-
quirement of causation depends on the rigid and artificial
distinction she draws between the issues of liability and
remedy under Title VII. More specifically, she argues
(Br. 31-32) that the special emphasis on the requirement
of causation in Section 706(g) of Title VII is rigidly
limited to that section and its specific limitation of
“make whole” remedies such as reinstatement and back
pay. From this she proceeds to the conclusion (Br. 32-
33) that “causation” is relevant only to the remedial
phase of the case—(one where the cards have, of course,
already been carefully stacked against the employer be-
cause of a shift in the burden of proof). Indeed, Con-
gress’s specification of the requirement of cause in Sec-
tion 706(g) is used to support the negative inference
that Congress was indifferent to the requirement of cause
in Section 7038 (a) (1).
Respondent is wrong. Section 706(g) does not exist
in a hermetically sealed universe, and its policies are not
at all irrelevant to questions of liability. It is, of course,
true that the requirement of “cause” specified in Section
706(g) does play an independent role in cases
whereliability m i i i
causation—for example, class actions brought under Sec-
tion 703 (a) (1), discriminatory “practices” cases brought
under Section 703(a) (2), and pattern-or-practice cases
brought by the government under Section 707(a). Sec-
tion 706(g) assures that in such cases relief will be lim-
ited to a declaration or perhaps an injunction, and will
not include reinstatement and back pay for persons who













were not in fact the victims of discrimination, But the
fact that Section 706(g) plays this independent role in
cases where causation is not required to establish liabil-
ity does not mean that the congressional purpose ex-
presed in Section 706(g) is irrelevant to problems ofliability. Still less does it Support the negative-spin in-ference that Congress intended to dispense with require-ments of causation in the liability aspect of all Title
VII cases.
In fact, the legislative history of Section 706 (g) estab-lishes without doubt that the overriding purpose of theparticular language Specifying that certain forms ofremedy are prohibited where the employer acts for “anyreason other than” a prohibited reason was to integratethe remedial provision with what was assumed to be thefundamental policy of the liability sections. As Represen-tative Celler said, “the purpose of the amendmentis toSpecify- cause.” “[T]he court, for example, cannot findany violation of the act which is based on facts other”than discrimination. 110 Cong. Rec. 2567 (1964) (em-phasis added). Representative Gill said that the Con-gress wished to “pinch down” orders under this act andthat “we would limit orders under this act to the pur-poses of this act.” Id. at 2570 (emphasis added). Theseauthoritative expressions are completely inconsistent withthe notion that “cause” was to be deemed important onlyin connection with the Secondary remedial aspects of thecase (where its meaning would in addition be whollydiluted by respondent’s contention that, in this remedial]






phase, the employer must carry the burden of persua-
sion).
CONCLUSION
Respondent’s strategy in this case is plain. Under her
theory, Hopkins has the burden of persuasion, but need
not establish causation—she carries her burden by show-
ing that a discriminatory thought or comment wassuffi-
ciently “in the air” that it may have played an “unde-
fined” role in an employment decision. (This is, func-
tionally, no more than the equivalent of the first stage
(“prima facie” case) of the Burdine framework. Indeed,
respondent’s theory of Title VII is simply an elaborate
way to jettison from the law Burdine’s third stage—the
requirement that plaintiff show that the valid reason
demonstrated by the employer was not the “true” rea-
son.) Having shown, on the basis of this flimsy thresh-
old requirement, that defendant is a “wrongdoer” (Br.
33), respondent has set the stage for the next move—the
shift to the employer of the burden of persuasion (in-
deed, by a “clear and convincing” showing) on the issue
of remedy. The upshot is a stacking of the deck that
would make it virtually impossible for an employer to
establish that the “true” reason for its decision was not
discrimination.
Hopkins now agrees with us that the court of appeals
erred by requiring Price Waterhouse to bear the burden
of persuasion at the liability stage of the case. The issue
thus boils down to the standard that she must meet to
show that the decision to postpone partnership in her
case was “because of” her sex. As we demonstrated in
our opening brief, and again here, adoption of any
standard other than the traditional “but for” test is in-
consistent with the language and purposes of Title VII.
This being so, the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine frame-
work, which exists only to facilitate inquiry into the
plaintiff’s ultimate burden of proving that she was “the
victim of intentional discrimination,” Texas Dep’t of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981),
clearly applies in this individual disparate treatment
 
 







case; and the court of appeals’ abandonment of that
framework wasplainly in error. Having failed to prove
that she would have been made a partner in the absence
of discrimination and that the valid reason shown by
Price Waterhouse for its decision was not the “true rea-
son,” it follows that Hopkins has simply been unable to
establish that she was in fact “the victim of intentional
discrimination.”
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those stated in
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